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Mika v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 71 (Sep. 24, 2015)1 
 
Contracts: Arbitration Agreements 
 
Summary 
 
The court denied extraordinary writ relief from the district court’s decision to 
compel arbitration between Petitioners and their employer based on a long-form 
arbitration agreement signed only by the Petitioners, and federal law favoring arbitration 
agreements.2  
 
Background 
I. 
 
Petitioners Donald Mika, Beryl Harter, and Dennis Tallman all signed short-form 
and long-form arbitration agreements with their former employer, and real party in 
interest, CPS Security (USA), Inc.  The identical long-form agreements included a clause 
waiving the right to initiate or participate in any class action lawsuit against CPS or any 
of its representatives.    
After disputes regarding minimum wage and overtime claims, Petitioners brought 
separate class action styled lawsuits against CPS in state court. The two suits were 
assigned to the same district court judge who denied Petitioners’ motions for class 
certification and entered orders compelling individual arbitration of Mika’s, Harter’s, and 
Tallman’s claims.  
Petitioners argued the long-form arbitration agreement, including the class action 
waiver, was invalid because (1) it was not countersigned by CPS and (2) the class action 
waiver violates state and federal law.  
 
Discussion 
II. 
 
While the parties did not adequately address the requirements for extraordinary 
writ relief through their briefs, the court still accepted mandamus review for two reasons. 
First, Kindred v. Second Judicial Dist. Court3 may have led the parties to believe the lack 
of a right of interlocutory direct appeal made mandamus readily available. Second, 
petitioners presented a nonfrivolous argument that the National Labor Relations Act4 
(NLRA) invalidates class waivers in employment arbitration agreements even though the 
court’s decision to invalidate class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements in 
Picardi v. Eight Judicial Dist. Court5 was contradicted by the subsequent decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.6 
                                                        
1  By Kory Koerperich. 
2  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
3  Kindred v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 405, 409, 996 P.2d 903, 906 (2000). 
4  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (2014)   
5  See Picardi v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 106, 251 P.3d 723 (2011). 
6  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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The court questioned any interpretation of Kindred that suggests a writ of 
mandamus should automatically be granted from an order compelling arbitration. 
Because NRS § 38.247(a)(1) does not provide for direct interlocutory appeals from an 
order compelling arbitration, 7  Kindred concluded that petitioners have no remedy 
available other than an extraordinary writ.8  However, the court clarified that a party 
seeking writ relief still needs to show why an eventual appeal after final judgment will 
not serve as a “plain, speedy and adequate remedy” pursuant to NRS § 34.170.9 
III. 
 
The threshold question was whether the long-form arbitration agreement and class 
waiver clause were part of a valid contract even though CPS did not sign the agreement. 
The court concluded NRS § 38.219(1) requires an arbitration agreement be in writing, but 
does not require the agreement be signed to be enforceable.10 It made sense for CPS not 
to pre-sign the long-form arbitration agreement because the signing employee had a 30-
day opt-out period. Therefore, petitioners accepted the terms of the long-form agreement 
after they did not timely opt out during the 30-day period.  
Petitioners Mika and Harter also argued that they sued additional defendants that 
were not parties to the CPS arbitration agreements and therefore those parties couldn’t 
enforce the arbitration agreements. However, the court found the contract, by its own 
terms and by general principles of agency, included all of the defendants named in 
Petitioners Mika and Harter’s complaint.  
 
IV. 
A. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion abrogates this courts decision in 
Picardi. In Picardi, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that class action waivers violate 
Nevada public policy, and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not force states to 
enforce arbitration agreements that violate the public policy of the state. 11 Similarly, the 
California Supreme Court held in Discover Bank v. Superior Ct. that class action waivers 
are unconscionable in consumer contracts when the amounts disputed are too 
insignificant to be prosecuted individually, thus allowing the stronger party to escape 
liability.12 However, in Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Federal Arbitration 
Act preempted California’s Discover Bank rule.13  
 Petitioners’ argued, and the court rejected, that even though Concepcion abrogates 
Picardi just as fully as it abrogates Discover Bank, Concepcion is distinguishable from 
the facts of this case because (1) Concepcion is limited to consumer arbitration 
agreements; and (2) Concepcion only applies to cases in federal court, not state court.  
The court ruled Concepcion prevents a state court from invalidating a class waiver 
in an arbitration agreement, when the claims involve commerce, on the basis that 
                                                        
7  Clark Cnty. v. Empire Elec., Inc., 96 Nev. 18, 20, 604 P.2d 352, 353 (1980). 
8  Kindred, 116 Nev. at 409, 996 P.2d at 906. 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.170. 
10  See Campanelli v. Conservas Altamira, S.A., 86 Nev. 838, 842, 477 P.2d 870, 872 (1970).  
11  Picardi, 127 Nev. at 114. 
12  Discover Bank v. Superior Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
13  Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.  
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individual arbitration of the employee’s state law claims for overtime and minimum wage 
would be ineffective. The court followed the analysis of the California Supreme Court in 
Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC.14 In Iskanian, the court decided that 
even if a rule against class waivers in arbitration agreements is stated narrowly, it is not 
saved from FAA preemption and Concepcion.15  As a result, the California Supreme 
Court upheld a district court order compelling arbitration in a class action wage claim 
brought in the employment context. 16  Here, the court agreed with the reasoning of 
Iskanian and found that nothing in Concepcion suggests that FAA preemption does not 
apply broadly in other contexts such as state law wage and hour claims.  
The court also found that as long as commerce is involved, the FAA applies. 
Thus, when the FAA applies, contradictory state law is preempted whether the claim is 
brought in federal or state court.17 So, even though the right to a minimum wage is so 
important that the Nevada Constitution secures it,18 petitioners are still not entitled to 
litigate on a class basis when petitioners have agreed to arbitrate claims on an individual 
basis.19  
 
B. 
 
Petitioners also argued, as decided by the National Labor Relations Board in In re 
D.R. Horton, Inc. (“Horton I”), 20  that the National Labor Relations Act provides a 
“contrary congressional command” that overrides the FAA. 21 Section 7 of the NLRA 
grants employees the right to “engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 22 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 
then provides that an employer cannot “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” in 
exercising the rights established by Section 7. As arbitration agreements force employees 
to give up their Section 8 right to collective procedures for their own “mutual aid or 
protection,” Horton I held that Section 8 of the NLRA made it illegal for employers to 
require employees to arbitrate employment-related claims on an individual basis.23 The 
NLRB found its decision was not contrary to the FAA, because the FAA does not require 
enforcement of illegal contracts.24 
However, in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB (“Horton II”), the Fifth Circuit overruled 
Horton I’s finding that class arbitration waivers were illegal. 25  The Fifth Circuit found 
that the NLRB’s decision in Horton I essentially prohibited class waivers in arbitration 
                                                        
14  Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). 
15  Id. at 135. 
16  Id.  
17  Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012). 
18  NEV. CONST. art. 15, § 16. 
19  See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350 (“States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”). 
20  In re D.R. Horton, Inc. (Horton I), 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274, *1 (Jan. 3, 2012). 
21  Accord Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454, *12 (Oct. 28, 2014) (quoting 
CompuCredit Corp. v Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 668–69 (2012)). 
22  29 U.S.C. § 157.  
23  Horton I, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 at *1.  
24  Accord Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 72, 2014 WL 5465454 at *12. 
25  D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB (Horton II), 737 F.3d 344, 359–61 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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agreements, and was therefore “an actual impediment to arbitration [that] violates the 
FAA.”26 
Ultimately, the court followed the overwhelming majority of courts, including 
Horton II and Iskanian, and found that Horton I’s invalidation of class arbitration waivers 
was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the FAA in Concepcion. 
The court reasoned that the FAA’s broad policy favoring arbitration is not sufficiently 
contradicted by Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA to permit invalidation of class waiver 
clauses in arbitration agreements. 
 
V. 
 
The court also upheld the district court’s rejection of Petitioner Tallman’s 
argument that CPS waived its right to compel arbitration when it removed Tallman’s 
state court action to federal court and then litigated Tallman’s Fair Labor Standards Act 
claims. To prove waiver of CPS’ contractual right to arbitration, Tallman needed to show 
that “the party seeking to arbitrate (1) knew of his right to arbitrate, (2) acted 
inconsistently with that right, and (3) prejudiced the other party by his inconsistent 
acts.”27 Prejudice is the focus of the waiver analysis and may be shown when (1) the 
parties use discovery not available in arbitration, (2) the parties litigate substantial issues 
on the merits, or (3) compelling arbitration would require a duplication of efforts.28 
The court found that there was no discovery that would not have been available 
through arbitration, because the parties stipulated to not conduct discovery until they 
resolved class certification. The court also found that the federal court did not consider 
the merits of Tallman’s state law claims or the class certifications when it remanded those 
claims back to state court. Therefore, this was not a case where the party seeking 
arbitration “test[ed] the judicial waters” before it moved to compel arbitration.29  
Finally, the court held that CPS did not automatically waive the right to compel 
arbitration by removing the action from state to federal court,30 and that the issues in 
litigation were separate and distinct from any claims that should have been arbitrated. If 
anything, the court reasoned that the federal court proceedings actually helped eventual 
arbitration of Tallman’s state-law claims.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court properly enforced the long-form arbitration agreement by 
compelling arbitration of Petitioner’s claims on an individual basis. Petitioners and CPS 
had a valid class waiver clause even though CPS did not sign the long-form arbitration 
agreement. Thus, the FAA and Concepcion applied and preempted the state from 
invalidating the arbitration agreement even if the agreement might be contrary to the 
public policy of the state.  
                                                        
26  Id. at 359–60. 
27  Nevada Gold & Casinos, Inc. v. Am. Heritage, Inc., 121 Nev. 84, 90, 110 P.3d 481, 485 (2005). 
28  Id. at 90–91, 110 P.3d at 485. 
29  Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Uwaydah v. Van Wert Cnty. 
Hosp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2002)). 
30  See Halim v. Great Gasby’s Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 2008). 
